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ABSTRACT 
 
Governments derive its major part of revenue from tax. A tax is compulsory and 
mandatory contribution to the government from its subjects. It is mandatory to the sense 
that there is a legal document giving the government the mandate to collect such 
contribution. Imposition of tax, therefore, creates a tax liability upon those who are liable 
to pay the imposed tax .A tax liability is always expressed in monetary terms, and it is 
worth noting here that any monetary liability creates burden. Although it is said that the 
only things certain in life are death and taxes it is unmistakable that taxes are far from 
inevitable .Individuals do not like paying taxes and they take variety of actions to reduce 
their tax liabilities. The problem of tax compliance is as old as taxes themselves. Therefore 
this explains that tax non compliance started when taxes started. Non tax compliance is a 
serious problem that cannot be studied and understood by simple analysis. This was the 
basis for the researcher to investigate how social norms and tax system influence the level 
of   tax compliance among small and medium taxpayers in Tanzania Specifically in Tanga 
city using descriptive and correlation analysis. Data was collected from representative 
sample of 108 small and medium taxpayers in Tanga city under categories of retailers, 
wholesalers, manufactures and service providers. Using descriptive and correlation 
analysis for components of social norms and tax compliance, tax system and tax 
compliance and lastly social norms and tax system it was determined that there is positive 
relationship between the selected components of social norms and tax compliance, tax 
system and tax compliance and lastly social norms and tax system The study concludes 
that, there is significant existence of positive relationship between social norms, tax 
system and tax compliance. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Problem 
Governments derive its major part of revenue from tax. Tax is compulsory and mandatory 
contribution to the government from its subjects. It is mandatory to the sense that there is a 
legal document giving the government the mandate to collect such contribution. However 
if carefully analysed this definition may include such payments as fine and penalties paid 
to government .The most dependable definition was given by Hugh Dalton stating tax as a 
compulsory contribution imposed by public authority, irrespective of the exact amount of 
service rendered to the taxpayer in return and not imposed as a penalty for any legal 
offence. 
 
Imposition of tax, therefore, creates a tax liability upon those who are liable to pay the 
imposed tax .A tax liability is always expressed in monetary terms, and it is worth noting 
here that any monetary liability creates burden. In other words imposition of tax creates a 
tax burden on taxpayers. 
 
No government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers ‘sense of duty to 
remit what is owed. Some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe, but many 
others will not (Slemrod, 2007). Over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink, as they see 
how they are being taken advantage of by the others. Thus, paying taxes must be made a 
legal responsibility of citizens, with penalties imposed on noncompliance. But even in the 
face of those penalties, substantial tax evasion exists and always has.  The history of 
taxation is replete with episodes of evasion, often notable for their inventiveness. During 
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the third century, many wealthy Romans buried their jewelry or stocks of gold coin to 
evade the luxury tax, and homeowners in eighteenth-century England temporarily bricked 
up their fireplaces to escape notice of the hearth tax collector (Webber and Wildavsky, 
1986). 
 
Although it is said that the only things certain in life are death and taxes it is unmistakable 
that taxes are far from inevitable (Alm, 1999). Individuals do not like paying taxes and 
they take variety of actions to reduce their tax liabilities. Some of these actions can be 
taken as tax avoidance or legal reduction of tax liabilities by practice that can take full 
advantage of tax codes, such as income splitting, postponement of tax and tax arbitrage 
across income that faces different tax treatment. Tax evasion includes illegal and 
intentional actions taken by individuals to reduce their legally due tax obligation. 
Individuals and firms can evade taxes by underreporting their income, sales or wealth, by 
overstating deductions or exemptions or credits or by failing to file appropriate tax returns. 
Tax evasion is difficult to measure, but still there is widespread that tax evasion is 
extensive and common in nearly all the countries. 
 
1.2 Statement of Research Problem 
The problem of tax compliance is as old as taxes themselves (Andreon 1998). Therefore 
this explains that tax non compliance started when taxes started. Also Nabaweesi, (2006) 
said that majority of the taxpayers under the presumptive tax system in Uganda have 
continued to be difficult to monitor and mutate. In Tanzania, taxpayers exhibit varying 
levels of tax compliance. Social norms and tax system may be serious influencers on the 
grounds that it may have played big part in tax evasion. This therefore sets the basis for 
the researcher to investigate how social norms and tax system influence the level of   tax 
compliance among small and medium taxpayers in Tanzania Specifically in Tanga city. 
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1.3 Objectives of the Study 
1.3.1 General Objectives 
The main objective of the study is to determine how social norms and tax system influence 
tax compliance among small and medium taxpayers in Tanga city, Tanzania. 
 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives 
The specific objectives of the study are hereunder;- 
1. To determine the relationship between social norms and tax compliance. 
2. To determine the relationship between tax systems and tax compliance. 
3. To determine the relationship between tax systems and social norms. 
 
1.4 Research Questions  
1. What is the relationship between social norms and tax compliance? 
2. What is the relationship between tax systems and tax compliance?  
3. What is the relationship between tax systems and social norms? 
 
1.5   Significance of the Study 
This study will help TRA to identify the existing level of tax compliance and how social 
norms and tax system influence that level of tax compliance. Apart from that it will also 
help taxpayers to know how their social norms and existing tax systems influence their tax 
compliance. Proper understanding of those facts that leads to tax evasion will guide the 
policy makers to provide easy instructions/conditions and system or enact laws that will 
combat tax evasion. 
 
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is made up of five chapters. Chapter one introduces the study by 
discussing background to the study, the statement of the problem, purpose of the study, 
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research objectives and research questions. Chapter two is a review of the variables under 
study which are social norms, tax system and tax compliance. From the works of various 
scholars and academicians the variables are discussed and the relationship between them 
derived. Chapter three describes the methodology used by the researcher to collect data in 
order to achieve the objectives of the study. This chapter describes the research design, 
study area and population, the sample size, sampling design, data sources and data 
collection methods as well as methods of presentation, interpretation and analysis of the 
findings. Chapter four will include presentation, analysis and discussion of research 
findings and lastly chapter five will include summary, conclusion and recommendation. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the main concepts which have been offered to 
account for the notion of tax compliance in Tanzania. Literature review for the rationale of 
developing the conceptual framework of this study dwells on theoretical and empirical 
evidence from the discussions on tax compliance, social norms and tax system. The 
chapter will also wind up by presenting a theoretical framework and a conceptual model 
derived from reviewed literature. The theoretical framework is aimed at analyzing the 
influence of social norms and tax system on tax compliance. 
 
2.1.1 Tax Compliance Defined 
Tax compliance typically means, true reporting of the tax base, correct computation of the 
liability (accuracy), timely filing of the return, and timely payment of the amounts due i.e. 
timeliness (Franzoni, 1999). Tax compliance in respect to income tax is defined as the 
ratio of declared income to actual income (Chang at el, 2000). Tax non-compliance or 
evasion, on the other hand, happens when taxpayers intentionally fail to comply with their 
tax obligations, resulting to loss of revenue, which may cause serious damage to the 
proper functioning of the public sector (Franzoni, 1999).  
 
Tax non-compliance can be addressed from a variety of perspectives, including prevailing 
social norms and morals, complexity of tax laws and regulations, ethical and sociological 
motivations, audit rates and penalties. Most of the analysis of non-compliance has focused 
on how non-compliance or evasion is deterred through detection and sanctions (Franzoni, 
1999), which approach cannot satisfactorily explain non-compliance among taxpayers. 
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Alm, at el (1995), have come up and said that, tax compliance cannot be explained 
entirely by levels of enforcement. 
 
2.1.2 Social Norms and Tax Compliance 
Social norms refer to injunctive norms (Cialdini at el, 1991) that is normative 
prescriptions regarding tax compliance or, conversely, the normative acceptability of 
noncompliance. Likewise, it has been argued that social norms, that is, the perceived 
practice or endorsement of evasion among reference others, impact on tax compliance 
(Wenzel, 2004). Social norms, if internalized, should reduce the perceived opportunity 
structure and, as mentioned, reduce the will to cheat on taxes. Social norms have usually 
been studied as the perceived prevalence or acceptance of tax evasion among a reference 
group (DeJuan, at el 1994; Porcano, 1988; Webley at el, 2001); or as naturally varying 
between different cultural or sub cultural groups (Alm, at el, 1995). In either case, the 
evidence is only of a correlation nature and we do not know whether social norms causally 
affect one’s taxpaying behavior or whether social norms are constructed so as to explain 
and justify the behaviour.  
 
None the less following the logic of the moral/social actor view, social norms should 
influence taxpaying behavior, when they are internalised through a process of 
identification with the relevant social group (Wenzel, 2004). That is, perceived social 
norms which will causally affect tax compliance when taxpayers are identified with the 
group to which the norms are attributed. The causal effect will be mediated by the 
internalisation of social norms through which they become part of the taxpayer’s own 
individual make-up. However, from a sociological perspective, it is often assumed that 
human behavior is determined by social norms to a substantial extent. Sometimes this also 
includes tax behavior as well as other economic behavior (Etzioni, 1988).  
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In this literature, it is argued that tax evasion, or tax compliance, is determined by 
prevailing social tax norms to a substantial extent. For example, McClelland at el (1999) 
turn to social norms of tax compliance in order to understand the puzzle that 
underreporting is not higher than it is, considering the low likelihood of detection and the 
weak penalties for tax cheating in most countries. Smith & Kinsey (1987) develop a 
social-psychological model for taxpaying behavior where normative expectations are 
given a central position. Lewis (1982) takes a similar position. Wentworth & Rickel 
(1985) conclude that norm commitment may be a crucial factor in the decision to comply 
with or evade legally mandated taxes. McKee at el (1992) give experimental evidence for 
such a conclusion, and Frey & Weck-Hanneman (1984) draw the same conclusion based 
on tax surveys. They found that their measure of tax morality was significantly related to 
the size of the hidden economy, estimated with the technique of unobserved variables.  
 
According to Edlund & Åberg (2002), Taxpayers have a sense of reciprocity. Hence, they 
are less resistant to earmarked taxes where they perceive the benefit of a tied government 
service. Another example of is that people are more likely to comply with a tax when they 
perceive that other taxpayers comply (Cummings et al., 2004), the evidence that norms 
affect tax compliance. For example, people tend to contribute to public goods when they 
perceive that others contribute, even though they would maximize their own return by not 
contributing.  
 
However the process of formation of norms and moral values related to tax behavior has, 
to our knowledge, not been empirically studied and the arguments claiming that norms 
exert strong influences on tax behavior are not totally convincing (Hessing at el, 1988). 
The authors cast further doubts on the effectiveness of social tax norms in affecting tax 
behavior.  
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While according to Alm et al., (2006) the existence of social norms suggests that citizens 
will comply as long as they believe that compliance is widespread and thus the accepted 
social norm. Social norms have usually been studied as the perceived prevalence or 
acceptance of tax evasion among a reference group (DeJuan at el, 1994; Porcano, 1988; 
Webley at el, 2001); or as naturally varying between different cultural or sub cultural 
groups ( Sanchez at el, 1995).  
 
Taxation is thus a key arena for the development of norms of generalized state-society 
reciprocity, defined as “a continuing relationship of exchange that is at any given time 
unrequited or imbalanced, but that involves mutual expectations that a benefit granted now 
should be repaid in the future” (Paler, 2003). 
 
2.1.3 Tax System and Tax Compliance 
A central issue in public economics is the appropriate design of a tax system. Such a 
system is usually viewed as balancing the various desirable attributes of taxation, taxes 
must be raised (revenue-yield) in a way that treats individuals fairly (equity), that 
minimizes interference in economic decisions (efficiency), and that does not impose undue 
costs on taxpayers or tax administrators (simplicity). 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the extent of tax compliance in many developing countries 
has been decreasing. The underdeveloped tax system/structure is one of the major causes 
for this phenomenon. In the Fischer Model, the effectiveness of tax system is affected by 
complexity of tax system, probability of detection and penalties and tax rates. 
 
As the tax law has become increasingly complex, complexity has come to be recognized 
as a possible reason for tax noncompliance (Jackson and Milliron, 1986). In the context of 
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tax compliance decisions, complexity should include two dimensions, excessive detail in 
the tax rules and numerous computations required. Taxpayers should be able to understand 
the tax rules for computations by which they are to be taxed. These tax rules should aim to 
be simple, understandable and clear in order to enhance tax compliance.  
 
In general, complexity of tax system should increase as the number of criteria specified by 
tax laws increase. Clotfelter, (1983) reveals that complexity of tax system has been 
associated with greater underreporting of tax. Milliron, (1985) also finds that complexity 
has a significant effect on tax compliance decision. Richardson, (2006) also reports that 
tax law complexity is significantly related to tax evasion. 
 
In general, higher audit probabilities and severe penalties encourage tax compliance. 
Probability of detection refers to the likelihood that the tax authorities will discover an 
individual’s noncompliance and seek to remedy the evasion. Individuals normally would 
like to evade their tax liabilities entirely and the only reason they might not do so is that 
there is some non-zero probability of being caught (Massimo, 1993). Raising the 
probability of detection will increase tax compliance and tax audit represents one of the 
effective detective measures used by tax authorities (Alm, 1991). 
 
 In fact, tax audits are considered to have both direct deterrent effect on the taxpayers 
actually audited and indirect deterrent effect on taxpayers not audited (Alm et al., 2004). 
Witte and Woodbury, (1985) find a significant positive relationship between the risk of tax 
audit and the rate of voluntary tax compliance. However, the study by Beron et al. (1990)  
reveals that tax audit exert only a modest positive effect on tax compliance. Another 
important factor affecting tax compliance is the relationship between tax compliance and 
the severity of sanctions. The idea is that fear of penalties prohibits tax noncompliance 
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behavior. Establishing an effective system to penalize tax evaders is an important measure 
to encourage tax compliance. Taxpayers will be more likely to comply if noncompliance 
may result in severe penalties. According to the theoretical work conducted by Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972), tax compliance can be increased by increasing the penalties 
associated with it. To be effective, penalties must be applied speedily and forcefully. Witte 
and Woodbury (1985) report a significant relationship between the severity of criminal 
sanctions and tax compliance. Other studies by Grasmick and Scott (1982) and Tittle 
(1980) also indicate that respondents acknowledging some form of tax noncompliance are 
less likely if such acts would result in severe penalties. The experimental studies 
conducted by Hasseldine et al. (2007) also show that severity of sanctions has significant 
effects on tax compliance behavior. 
 
Another major construct of tax system/structure in the Fischer model is tax rates. 
Empirical evidence has suggested that progressive versus flat tax rate is the significant 
structural variable in association with tax compliance behavior (Clotfelter, 1983). 
Research using experiments typically find that high tax rates are linked to less tax 
compliance (Friedland et al., 1978). Using the audited tax returns for individual taxpayers 
in Jamaica, Alm et al. (1993) also reveal that the probability of underreporting and the 
level of underreporting are positively related to the marginal tax rate. 
 
2.2 Tax Compliance Evaluation 
Levels of tax compliance among different group of people and from different location do 
differ. To understand difference in tax compliance, the following sections evaluate tax 
compliance from different perspectives. From the evaluated tax compliance level from 
different perspectives researcher will be able to understand the general tax compliance 
level worldwide, Africa and at country level. 
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2.2.1 Tax Compliance in Worldwide Perspective 
Questions about tax compliance are as old as taxes themselves and will remain an area of 
discovery as long as taxes exist. To understand the impact of a tax system, it is important 
to know who complies with the tax law as well as who does not. Tax evasion is a large and 
growing problem in almost all countries. Unfortunately, we know very little about tax 
morale. Economists see the problem as one of rational decision made under uncertainty. 
This means that cheating on taxes is a gamble paying off in lower taxes or, with the 
probability of detection, ending in sanctions. This view of taxpayer behavior was first 
presented in a formal model by Allinghamand Sandmo (1972), influenced by the 
economics-of-crime approach (Becker 1968). Nevertheless, such a portfolio analysis 
cannot explain why many households comply more fully than predicted by this approach.  
 
2.2.2 Tax Compliance in Africa  
Most African countries face a trilemma with respect to taxation. One there is an urgent and 
Obvious need for more revenues to enable resource poor states to provide and maintain 
even the Most basic public services. Two the reality is, however, that those with political 
power and economic ability are few and do not want to pay tax. Three moreover, those 
without political power are many, have almost nothing to tax, and do also resist paying 
taxes. The trilemma is amplified by three trends common to many African countries 
(Fjeldstad et al.,2000). One is a recent process of democratization, which, if western 
experiences hold, will have profound implications for taxation. It is likely that 
governments, seeking power on the basis of popular consent, face restrictions in their use 
of coercion in tax collection. The other is that aid flows, which presently constitute more 
than half of state budgets in some countries, are declining, making tax revenues even more 
important for state incomes. Aid flows are, furthermore, increasingly conditioned on 
improved domestic revenue mobilization.  
12 
 
The third trend is that globalisation leads to increasing integration of the world’s goods 
and capital markets. Countries shave to adhere to international trade and investment 
agreements. These developments impose severe constraints on the ability of developing 
economies to choose their own tax policy directions. It follows that the challenge for 
taxation is to raise domestic revenues from consenting citizens in poor and increasingly 
open economies. It should be added that most of these economies are not growing rapidly. 
Elected governments in African countries are therefore facing hard choices about taxation. 
These decisions will most likely have profound impacts on the future of democratization 
itself and on public service provision. They will also have considerable implications for 
the politics and sustainability of aid.  
 
2.2.3 Tax Compliance in Tanzania 
Odd-Helge  (2006) showed that, the tax base in Tanzania tends to be narrow, excluding 
relatively important sectors in the economy that are not fully monetized or incorporated in 
the formal economy, such as large segments of agriculture, small-scale trade and services. 
Moreover, tax evasion by large segments of the formal economy is particularly 
widespread in the trade sector and among self-employed professionals and property 
owners, and tax exemptions are still common. Thus, if the tax net captures only half of the 
economic activity (not an unreasonable estimate), a 20 percent tax ratio translates into a 40 
percent ratio on the average for those who pay taxes. 
 
2.2.4 Evaluation of Tax Authorities 
Motivational postures have been used in past research to capture the way regulatees 
position themselves in relation to regulatory authority (Braithwaite etal., 1994; 
Braithwaite, 1995). Authorities may have legal legitimacy, but this does not guarantee 
them psychological legitimacy. Individuals and groups evaluate authorities in terms of 
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what they stand for and how they perform. As evaluations are made, revised, shared and 
accumulated over time, individuals and groups taxing democracy develop positions in 
relation to the authority. A psychological concept that is central to positioning is social 
distance (Bogardus, 1928).This term was used to refer to the degree to which individuals 
(or groups) had positive feelings for other ethnic groups and ascribed status to other ethnic 
groups. 
 
 In the regulatory context, social distance indicates liking and the ascription of status to the 
regulatory authority. When individuals and groups decide how much they want to 
associate or be aligned with an authority, and how much they want to be out of reach of 
and out of contact with the authority, they are indicating the social distance they wish to 
place between themselves and the authority. The distance placed between regulatee and 
regulator may be intuitive at first, but it does not remain that way for long. Individuals and 
groups articulate their beliefs, develop rationalisations for their feelings, and use values 
and ideologies to justify the ways they position themselves in relation to legally 
sanctioned authorities (Sykes and Matza, 1957; Rokeach, 1973; Griffin and Buehler, 1993; 
Bersoff, 1999).  
 
These interconnected sets of beliefs and attitudes are shared, borrowed, challenged, and 
elaborated upon even further as part of the social life of a community. The interconnected 
sets of beliefs and attitudes that are consciously held and openly shared with others are 
called motivational postures. Five motivational postures have been identified as important 
in the context of taxation compliance: (a) commitment, (b) capitulation, (c) resistance, (d) 
disengagement, and (e) game playing. The two postures that reflect an overall positive 
orientation to authority are commitment and capitulation. Commitment reflects beliefs 
about the desirability of tax systems and feelings of moral obligation to act in the interest 
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of the collective and pay one’s tax with good will. Capitulation reflects acceptance of the 
tax office as the legitimate authority and the feeling that the tax office is a benign power as 
long as one acts properly and defers to its authority.  
 
In contrast to these postures of deference, are three postures of defiance. The first is the 
familiar posture of resistance. Resistance reflects doubts about the intentions of the tax 
office to behave cooperatively and benignly towards those it dominates and provides the 
rhetoric for calling on taxpayers to be watchful, to fight for their rights, and to curb tax 
office power. Disengagement is also a motivational posture that communicates resistance, 
but here the disenchantment is more widespread, and individuals and groups have moved 
beyond seeing any point in challenging the authorities. The tax office and the tax system 
are beyond redemption for the disengaged citizen, the main objective being to keep both 
socially distant and blocked from view. 
 
The fifth posture is game playing. Unlike the previous postures, game playing has not 
been examined in other regulatory contexts, emerging instead from discussions about 
posturing with tax officials and taxpayers. The behaviours previously have been described 
by social scientists working in fields involving economic regulation (McBarnet, 1992; 
McBarnet and Whelan, 1999). McBarnet sees game playing as a particular kind of attitude 
to law. Law is seen as something to be moulded to suit one’s purposes rather than as 
something to be respected as defining the limits of acceptable activity. Game playing was 
included as a motivational posture for the purposes of testing whether or not players 
consciously adopted this style of engagement with the tax system and the tax office. 
 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
In my study theoretical framework will explain how variables under study behave. Two  
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theories are going to be discussed namely standard theory of tax compliance and prospect 
theory. Standard theory of tax compliance will explain how personal income, tax rate, 
probability of being audited, fine and government expenditure affects tax compliance. On 
other side prospect theory will discuss how individual decision making process do affect 
tax compliance. 
 
2.3.1 The Standard Theory of Tax Compliance 
The standard theory of tax compliance is based on the work of Allingham and Sandmon, 
(1972). With this theory an individual is assumed to have a fixed endowment of income I, 
and must choose the amount to report to the tax authorities. Declared income D is taxed at 
the rate t. undeclared income is not taxed but the individual may be audited with 
probability p, at which point a fine f is imposed on each unit of unpaid taxes. The 
individual chooses D to maximize the expected utility of the evasion gamble.This 
framework suggests that there is demend of declared income that depends upon I, t, p, and 
f. 
 
D= D (I, t, p, F) 
It is straight forward that D increases with increase in the probability of detaction of 
penalty rate ,while the impact of t and I depends upon the individual attitude toward risk. 
Nearly all imperical work is based on this general specification. 
 
There are also other factors that seem likely to affect the compliance decision. An obvious 
and largely neglected factor is government expenditures. As emphases by Cowell and 
Goldon  (1988) “this seems a curious oversight ,since while the government takes away it 
also give back, and the latter activity surely exerts some influence on evasion. The demand 
for declared may therefore be modified to reflect the individual’s receipt of government 
expenditures G: 
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D= D (I, t, p, F, G) 
Among the variables discussed in this theory tax rate “t” and penalty rate “f” are 
ingredients of tax system. It is therefore from this theory tax system may influence the 
level of tax compliance. Individual will choose the Income to report D depending on 
among many factors the tax rate “t” and penalty rate “f”. 
 
2.3.2 Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory recognizes that individuals have limited cognitive abilities and the theory 
envisions an editing step in the decision process that helps the decision maker simplify the 
process. In the editing step, the decision maker may simplify the decision by attending to 
only some factors, ignoring others, and encoding aspects into meaningful forms such as 
gains or losses. Most applications of prospect theory in the tax compliance research area 
have examined the violation of the expected utility tenet of description invariance, called 
the “reflection effect” (gain/loss framing effect). That is the same outcome can be edited 
as either a gain or a loss depending on the reference point presented in the decision frame, 
and a different decision is likely depending on the frame adopted. The decision maker 
focuses on changes in wealth or welfare from the reference point (current wealth position) 
rather than focusing on the final wealth state. 
 
 Income then is not the only argument of the cardinal utility function, and marginal utility 
is not always positive and strictly decreasing. Rather, prospect theory proposes that 
individuals will display a value (utility) function that is concave for gains and convex for 
losses, with’ the latter being steeper than the former. The shape of this value function 
suggests that individuals will be risk averse for gain frames and risk seeking for loss 
frames, where risk averse is defined as preferring a certain choice over a risky choice of 
equal or greater value (Kahneman and Tversky,1979). 
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The framing effect described by prospect theory is by no means ‘considered to be 
universal (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982). It is merely descriptive of how some 
individuals will be behave some of the time. Other factors, such as social norms, ethics, 
and personal characteristics, may affect how a decision is edited and thus affect the 
ultimate decision made. Failing to consider these factors, much of the tax research 
examining framing effects has produced inconsistent findings (Chang at el, 1987; 
Schepanski and Kelsey, 1990, Casey and Scholz, 1991). 
 
The conclusions that can be drawn from prior research may be summarized as follows, 
one specific ethical values differ from individual to individual, two specific ethical values 
correlate highly with self reported tax compliance, three specific ethical values can limit 
the choices considered in decision making, four the findings regarding the effect of tax 
rates on taxpayer compliance are inconclusive and five the findings regarding the 
applicability of the prospect theory framing effects to tax behavior are inconsistent. 
 
It is proposed that ethical beliefs are one of the screening factors that taxpayers use in the 
editing phase of decision making. Ethical values set bounds on behavior and reduce 
analysis of choices by eliminating all alternatives that are not congruous with the ethical 
beliefs held by the decision maker. Thus, taxpayers may edit out of the possible choices all 
those that are not viewed as consistent with their moral duty of tax compliance. However, 
not all taxpayers will view tax evasion with the same sense of morality. Many taxpayers 
pay little attention to tax matters and may not even view tax evasion as an ethical issue. 
Likewise, their ethical values may be much more tempered by situational exigencies than 
idealistic expectations. For these taxpayers, the context in which the decision is made will 
have a greater effect on the outcome (Scholz, 1985; Smith, 1990).  
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Prospect theory suggests that the yearend withholding position of a taxpayer can be 
framed as a gain (receive a refund) or as a loss (taxes due), and this framing can affect the 
taxpayer’s compliance decisions when filing an annual tax return. The theory predicts that 
taxpayers would be risk averse in a refund situation and risk seeking in a taxes due 
position.  
 
2.4 Research Gap  
While rarely examined, it is often taken for granted that social norms have a significant 
explanatory impact on tax evasion behavior. The purpose of this research is to analyze the 
relationships between social norms, tax systems and tax compliance. Tax compliance is a 
concern to governments around the world. Prior research has attributed unexplained inter-
relationships and differences in compliance rates to differences in social norms and tax 
systems. 
 
Therefore addressing this knowledge gap is the primary purpose of this study in order to 
find out how social norms and tax system influence tax compliance behavior in Tanzania 
especially in Tanga city. 
 
2.5 Conceptual Framework  
This study proposes a conceptual framework which consists summarized number of 
relationships discussed in the previous reviews of literature and theories. 
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual Framework ( Fisher,1992) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter explains the methods and techniques used in this research. The study 
methodology of this research is correlation and descriptive analysis.  Also the chapter 
explains the study area, approach of data collection, tools for data collection, sampling 
design, data analysis and presentation procedures of results. 
 
3.2 Study Area 
The selected area for the research was Tanga city which is among the seven districts in the 
Tanga regions located in the northern coast of Tanzania.  The city is located between 
Latitude: 54' 0. 012” S, Longitude: 396'0. 000” E. It is bordered to the East by the Indian 
Ocean and bordered to the North by Kenya(Mombasa) , West by Kilimanjaro region and 
South by Korogwe and Handeni Districts. According to the 2002 Tanzania National 
Census, the population of the Tanga city was 243,580. Currently the city is having 7,124 
live taxpayers divided in three blocks, namely Mkwakwani with 1547 taxpayers, 
Ngamiani with 3065 taxpayers and Chuda with 2512 taxpayers (RM TRA Tanga, 2012). 
The selection of study area considered many factors including the presence of required 
taxpayers in all sectors and categories to be studied, accessibility due to good city 
planning and good infrastructure. Other factors were easy accessibility of secondary data 
from tax authority and so far the study has not been conducted in the city. 
 
3.3 Source of Data 
This study used both primary data which was originally collected from the field and 
secondary data of which its nature is merely that of compilation of others work on the 
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subject. For the purpose of this study the details of the two sources of data follows under 
the next subsections. 
 
3.3.1 Primary Data 
Primary data used in this study was collected from a cross section of current small and 
medium taxpayers through structured questionnaire to taxpayers operating their businesses 
in Tanga city. Information obtained included but was not limited to business experience of 
respondent, nature of business, social perception on tax matters, existing tax system, 
follow up of due dates for payment of taxes, role of tax consultants and tax officials, total 
tax compliance costs, etc. 
 
3.3.2 Secondary Data 
Secondary data were obtained from existing literatures on the subject. The literatures were 
obtained from various source e.g. websites and library. Also data from tax Authority was 
of great importance on the subject specifically number of taxpayers, type of taxpayers, tax 
payment due dates monitoring etc. Other relevant published and unpublished reports were 
visited. 
 
3.4  Sample Size 
The sufficient numbers of taxpayers were needed to be considered so as to yield estimate 
of reasonable precision. Total population was comprised by 7,124 taxpayers in Tanga city, 
divided in three blocks namely Mkwakwani, Ngamiani and Chuda, each block was 
comprised of four sub blocks. To be more effective Tabacknicks and Fidell (2001) 
suggested that it is not the overall sample size that is of concern rather the ratio of subject 
to items. Recommendation was five (5) cases for each item. Therefore, for twenty core 
subject items discussed at least 100 respondents were enough to draw unbiased 
conclusion, the sample size taken therefore was 108 respondents. 
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Also the sample size consider the following basic characteristics, a truly representative 
sample, a Sample which results in a small sampling error, a Sample which is viable in the 
context of funds available for the research study, a sample of which systematic bias can be 
controlled in a better way, and a Sample which results of the sample study can be applied 
in general for the universe with a reasonable level of confidence. In consideration of the 
mentioned characteristics the sample size was comprised of 108 correspondents under the 
following categories.  
 
Table 3.1 Sample Size 
S/no Category Number of Respondents 
3 Manufactures 3 
4 Whole sellers 28 
5 Retailers 50 
6 Service providers 27 
     Source : Field data 2013 
3.5 Sampling Technique 
A multi stage sampling technique was used to select the respondents, stratified sampling 
was applicable and our strata were of Manufactures, wholesalers, retailers and service 
providers. Random sampling was then used to select respondents from the identified 
stratus to fill questionnaires. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
Quantitative data collected was analyzed using SPSS of which the researcher was able to 
draw patterns of relationships on the subject. Descriptive analysis by frequency was used 
to study the characteristics of the sampled population including age, sex, type of 
respondent etc. Also description by graphs and charts were used to describe individual 
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components of social norms, tax system and tax compliance of which relationship between 
components were discussed. In most social and business researches our interest lies in 
understanding and controlling relationships between variables then with determining 
causes per se and as such it is considered correlation analysis as relatively more important. 
 
Under this study two tailed Pearson’s Correlation analysis was used to describe the 
strength and direction of the relationship between the selected variables and the significant 
coefficients were flagged. For three components under study its components indicators 
were selected to be correlated to one another. Under relationship between social norms 
and tax compliance, social norms component were taken as independent variables and 
correlated to dependent components of tax compliance. On other hand, under relationship 
between tax system and tax compliance, tax system component were taken as independent 
variables and correlated to dependent components of tax compliance. Lastly Under 
relationship between social norms and tax system, social norms components were taken as 
independent variables and correlated to dependent components of tax system. Correlation 
coefficients (r) can take values from –1 to +1. The sign out the front indicates whether 
there is a positive correlation or a negative correlation. The size of the absolute value 
provides an indication of the strength of the relationship. A perfect correlation of 1 or –1 
indicates that the value of one variable can be determined exactly by knowing the value on 
the other variable. On the other hand, a correlation of 0 indicates no relationship between 
the two variables. 
 
3.7  Data Presentation 
Research report is a major component of the research study. As a matter of fact even the  
well formulated hypothesis, highly well designed and conducted research study, and the 
most striking generalizations and findings are of little value unless they are effectively 
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presented and communicated to others. The findings were presented by tables, matrixes 
and figures. Notes on qualitative information were presented whenever seen necessary by 
the researcher. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4.0 PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
4.1       Introduction 
This Chapter presents analytical findings from the study sample in order to determine the 
relationship between social norms, tax system and tax compliance. It begins with 
analyzing the general characteristics of the sample study, descriptive characteristics of 
individual components and lastly correlating the variables under study. 
 
4.2 Demographic Characteristics 
Demographic characteristics will address the category of respondent, age of respondent, 
sex and marital status of respondent, educational level of respondent, age and type of 
business and lastly taxpaying category of respondent. 
 
4.2.1 Category of Respondent 
From table 4.1 most of the businesses in Tanga are operated by owners comprising of 
63.9% followed by managers 30.6% and directors with 5.6 %. Therefore, most of selected 
business were not large enough to employ others to operate on behalf of owners, this 
signify little or no separation of duties in most of businesses operations of small and 
medium taxpayers. 
 
Table 4.1: Category of Respondent 
 Category of respondent Frequency Percent 
Owner 69 63.9 
Manager 33 30.6 
Director 6 5.6 
Total 108 100 
Source: Field data 2013 
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4.2.2 Age of Respondents 
Figure 4.1 classifies respondents according to their age, from the pie chart most of 
business owners are aging between 35 to 60 which make more than 60% of the sampled 
population followed by age of 18 to 35 taking approximately 40%.Age of 60 and above do 
not own or operate businesses in Tanga. This signify that it takes time to the age of above 
18 years old to own a business and it needs physical and mental strength of not exceed age 
of sixty to operate the same. From the sample taken all businesses are not owned or 
operated by individuals bellow the age of 18. 
 
Figure  4.1:Age of Respondents  
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.2.3 Sex of Respondents 
As presented in table 4.2, most of the respondents were male. This accounted for a 
proportion of 77.8% as compared to 22.2% of the respondents who were female. It could 
be explained that in every four small and medium business enterprises two are owned or 
operated by men as compared to one by women. 
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Table 4.2: Sex of Respondents 
Sex of respondents Frequency Percent 
 
Female 24 22.2 
Male 84 77.8 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.2.4 Marital Status of Respondents 
As presented in table 4.3, a significant number of the respondents were married. This 
accounted for a proportion of 66.7% as compared to 33.3% of the respondents who were 
single. The observed situation is supported by the fact that most of respondents reached 
were aging between 35 to 60.Other marital status categories of divorced and widow were 
not represented in a sample. 
 
Table 4.3 Marital Status 
Marital status of respondents Frequency Percent 
Married 72 66.7 
Single 36 33.3 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.2.5 Educational Level of Respondents 
The sampled population educational level as per Figure 4.2 were dominated by those with 
secondary education who took 52.8% as compared to primary level with 13.9%, certificate 
level with 22.2% and diploma and above with 11.1%.Simply more than 81% of the 
sampled population had education above secondary level of which researcher believed 
was enough for them to understand and take care of their tax affairs. 
28 
 
 
Figure 4.2 : Education Level  
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.2.6 Age of the Business 
From the table 4.4, majority of the respondents have been in business for period of 5-9 
years represented by 33.3% as compared to 13.9%, 25%,and 27.8% for 0 to 4, 10 to 14 
and above 15 years respectively. This explains the low rate of establishment of new 
businesses, also this explains most of businesses are matured and have existed for more 
than 5 years. 
 
Table 4.4: Age of Business 
Age of Business Frequency Percent 
0-4 15 13.9 
5-9 36 33.3 
10-14 27 25.0 
15 and above 30 27.8 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
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4.2.7 Nature of Business 
Figure 4.3 classifies businesses according to their nature, this grouping showed that most 
of small and medium businesses in Tanga is comprised of retail businesses taking 46.3% 
followed by whole sellers taking 25.9% service providers 25.0%, and manufactures 
2.8%.From the chart most of manufactures are not in Tanga and volume of purchase 
transactions by these existing traders are done from other regions. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 :Type of Business  
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.2.8 Nature of Taxpayer 
Table 4.5: Nature of Taxpayer 
Nature of taxpayer Frequency Percent 
Presumptive 72 66.7 
Accounts case 36 33.3 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
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Table 4.5 shows that, most of the small and medium taxpayers in Tanga are presumptive 
taking 66.7% as compared to 33.3% of accounts case. This signifies that almost 67% of 
the sampled population do not keep proper accounting records or do not keep records at 
all, the situation endanger tax compliance for most of small and medium taxpayers in 
Tanga. 
 
4.3 Descriptive Analysis of Study Variables 
Under descriptive analysis a number of summary statistics using charts and tables will be 
seen. The aim at this stage is to describe the general distributional properties of the data 
collected, to take care of any unusual observations (outliers) or any unusual patterns of 
observations that may cause problems for later analyses to be carried out on the data so 
collected. The summary statistics will be done on individual component of variables under 
study which are social norms, tax system and tax compliance. 
 
4.3.1 Social Norms 
Under social norms, selected individual components that form social norms under study 
are discussed separately in order to assess sample’s social norms regarding tax 
compliance. Expected impact of discussed components to tax compliance is also discussed 
in each social norm component selected. 
 
4.3.1.1 Commitment of Society to Pay Taxes 
Figure  4.4 explains the commitment of society to pay taxes, the figure shows that big part 
of the sampled population agreed on the statement  that, their society is committed to pay 
taxes followed by those who disagreed and few who strongly disagree and lastly 
indifference group. This indicates that, sampled population society is committed to pay 
taxes as expressed by most respondents. 
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Figure 4.4: commitment of Society to pay Taxes  
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.1.2 Influence to Pay Taxes 
Table 4.6: Influence to Pay Taxes 
our taxpaying behavior is influenced by some 
members of society 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 16 14.8 
Disagree 20 18.5 
Not sure 7 6.5 
Agree 43 39.8 
Strongly agree 22 20.4 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
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Table 4.6 explains the influence on tax paying behavior, most of the respondents agreed 
on the statement “our taxpaying behavior is influenced by some members of society” they 
were followed by those who disagreed, strongly disagreed and lastly not sure group. This 
display therefore states that, payment or non payment of taxes is the function of key 
persons in the given society as most of respondent agreed to be influenced in their tax 
payment behavior. 
 
4.3.1.3 Benefit from Taxes 
Figure 4.5 explains if the sampled population benefits from the taxes they pay to TRA. 
The leading response was agreement to the statement followed by those who were not 
sure, disagree, strongly disagree and agree. This explains that, the population is benefiting 
from the taxes they pay to TRA. Despite of those who agreed still there are some 
respondents who did not felt the benefit of taxes they pay. This figure generally states that, 
there are benefits from tax payment made and this is expected to increase tax compliance 
level. 
 
Figure 4.5: Benefit from Taxes  
Source: Field data 2013 
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4.3.1.4 Person Required to Pay Taxes 
Figure 4.6 shows the respondents views on the type of person required to pay taxes. From 
the field it has been observed that most of respondents agreed in their society every person 
who earns income should pay taxes. Few respondents were not sure, strongly disagreed 
and strongly agreed. These responses were enough to show society’s will to pay tax and its 
implication on tax compliance is expected to be positive. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Person Required to Pay Taxes  
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.1.5 Perception to Tax Evaders 
Society’s perception to tax evaders is displayed as per table 4.7, 55.6% of the sampled 
population agreed to have negative perception against tax evaders. Few respondents were 
in perception to see tax evaders as heroes. This shows that, the sample’s society does not 
support tax avoidance and its implication on tax compliance is expected to be low level of 
tax evasion. 
 
34 
 
Table 4. 7: Perception to Tax Evaders 
Tax evaders are not seen as heroes in our society Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 27 25.0 
Disagree 12 11.1 
Not sure 3 2.8 
Agree 60 55.6 
Strongly agree 6 5.6 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.2.6 Relationship between TRA and Taxpayers 
Relationship between TRA and taxpayers was evidenced to be a long term with mutual 
benefits as displayed in figure 4.7. The following group was those who were not sure on 
the nature of their relationship with TRA, this group were followed by those who strongly 
agreed, strongly disagreed and lastly disagreed. This relationship always has great 
influence on tax compliance as is expected to see high level of tax compliance when there 
is good relationship between TRA and taxpayers. 
 
Figure 4.7: TRA Relationship with Taxpayers  
Source: Field data 2013 
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4.3.2 Tax System 
Under tax system, selected individual components that form tax system under study are 
discussed separately in order to assess existing relationship between tax system and tax 
compliance. Expected impact of discussed components to tax compliance is also discussed 
in each tax system component selected. 
 
4.3.2.1 Tax Calculations and Procedures 
Most of the sampled population respondents were able to perform their own tax 
procedures and calculations as shown in table 4.8 (80.6%). This might mainly be caused 
by small size of the businesses sampled or simplicity in tax procedures, few of the 
respondents were using tax consultants or both themselves and tax consultants. Simplicity 
in tax calculations and procedures is expected to increase level of tax compliance. 
 
Table 4.8: Tax Procedures (Field data) 
I perform my own tax calculations and 
procedures 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 9 8.3 
Not sure 6 5.6 
Agree 87 80.6 
Strongly agree 6 5.6 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.2.2 Number of Taxes Administered by TRA 
Table 4.9 explains the reasonableness on the number of taxes administered by TRA. 
Agreement on reasonableness was above strong disagreement on the statement “taxes 
administered by TRA are reasonable in number for the authority to manage. These groups 
were followed by strong agreement, disagreement and not sure groups. Reasonable 
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number of taxes will reduce compliance cost to both TRA and taxpayers and therefore 
implies high level of tax compliance among taxpayers. 
 
Table 4.9: Number of Taxes administered by TRA 
Taxes administered by TRA are reasonable in 
number for the authority to manage 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 33 30.6 
Disagree 12 11.1 
Not sure 6 5.6 
Agree 36 33.3 
Strongly agree 21 19.4 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.2.3 Tax Collection Methods 
 
Figure 4.8: Tax Collection Methods Used by TRA  
Source: Field data 2013 
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Sampled population views were as follows, tax collection methods used by TRA are 
friendly to taxpayers as seen in figure 4.8. This agreement was followed by other 
responses. This figure gives a credit to tax collection methods used by TRA which in turn 
is expected to improve tax compliance among taxpayers. This figure implies to have 
taxpayers who pay their taxes on due dates, pay the actual tax assessed, do not evade taxes 
etc. 
 
4.3.2.4 TRA Use of Penalties and Offences to Combat Tax Evasion 
Agreement to TRA use of penalties and offences will combat tax evasion was a common 
answer to most of the respondents as seen in Table 4.10. Despite of the agreement, some 
of the respondents strongly disagreed to the statement while few of them were in 
disagreement and not sure positions. From the field, use of penalties may enhance tax 
compliance as it impose fear on non compliance and in turn is expected to increase tax 
compliance in terms of issuance of receipts, payment of taxes on due dates etc. 
 
  Table 4.10: TRA Use of Penalties and Offences  
TRA use of penalties and offences will combat 
tax evasion 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 27 25.0 
Disagree 12 11.1 
Not sure 6 5.6 
Agree 57 52.8 
Strongly agree 6 5.6 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.2.5 TRA Use of Tax Audit to Combat Tax Evasion 
47.2% of the sampled population agreed that, TRA use of tax audit can be a measure to  
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combat tax evasion as seen in Table 4.11. Despite of the agreement, in between 
respondents was following big group to the statement while few of them were in 
disagreement and strongly disagreed positions. Tax audit discloses taxes which were not 
properly paid as required by tax laws, afterward tax audit is expected to improve 
taxpayer’s compliance level, therefore with use of tax audit we expect to see high level of 
tax compliance. 
 
Table 4.11: TRA Use of Tax Audit  
TRA use of tax audit will combat tax evasion Frequency Percent 
 
Strongly disagree 6 5.6 
Disagree 3 2.8 
Not sure 36 33.3 
Agree 51 47.2 
Strongly agree 12 11.1 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
4.3.3 Tax Compliance 
Under tax compliance, selected individual components that form tax compliance under 
study are discussed separately in order to assess its relationship with previously discussed 
social norms and tax system components. This will reveal the impact of social norms and 
tax system on tax compliance. 
 
4.3.3.1 Payment of Taxes 
Table 4.12 explains taxpaying behavior of the sampled population. Most of respondents 
have been paying their taxes since commencement of their business by agreeing and 
strongly agreeing to the statement, few had never paid tax while others were not sure. The 
situation indicates tax compliance among medium and small taxpayers. This compliance 
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of paying taxes is the outcome of the social norms and tax system components discussed 
above. 
 
Table 4.12: Payment of Taxes 
I Have been paying taxes since commencement 
of my business 
Frequency Percent 
 
Strongly disagree 13 12.0 
Disagree 3 2.8 
Not sure 8 7.4 
Agree 52 48.1 
Strongly agree 32 29.6 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.3.2 Issuance of Receipts/Tax Invoice 
 
Figure 4.9: Issuance of Receipt/ Tax invoice  
Source: Field data 2013 
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Most of respondents were not sure if they issue receipt/tax invoice for every business 
transaction they make. This suggests questionable tax compliance as per figure 4.9. The 
following group was those who agreed to issue receipts and lastly were those who 
disagreed and strongly disagreed to issue receipt for every business transaction. 
 
4.3.3.3 Tax Avoidance 
Figure 4.10 explains an attempt to avoid taxes by respondents. From the sampled 
population most of respondents never attempted to avoid taxes, another dominant group 
was those who attempted to avoid taxes, other few respondents were not sure if they had 
an attempt to avoid taxes. This implies good tax compliance level to sampled population 
and shows positive relationship with most of social norms and tax system components. 
 
Figure 4.10: An Attempt to Avoid Taxes  
Source: Field data 2013 
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4.3.3.4 Payment of Taxes on Due Dates 
Payment of taxes on due dates was another indicator to measure tax compliance among 
medium and small taxpayers in Tanga city. Table 4.13 indicates that, most of respondents 
were paying their taxes on or before due dates as they agreed to the statement. Other 
groups of Strong agreement, disagreement and not sure were minority in terms of number. 
This good indicator of tax compliance level is a result of the previous discussed social 
norms and tax system components, this relationship are positive. 
 
Table4.13 : Payment of Taxes in Due Dates 
I always pay my taxes on or before due dates Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 9 8.3 
Disagree 15 13.9 
Not sure 9 8.3 
Agree 57 52.8 
Strongly agree 18 16.7 
Total 108 100.0 
      Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.3.5 Income Disclosure for Tax Purposes 
Agreement to income disclosure for tax purposes was a common answer to most of the 
respondents as seen in Table 4.14. Despite of the agreement, disagreement respondents 
were following big group to the statement while few of them were in strong disagreement 
.Another representative group who responded to the statement was strongly agreement 
group. This shows that, most of medium and small taxpayers in Tanga disclose their 
income for tax purposes. This implies good tax compliance level to sampled population 
and shows positive relationship with most of social norms and tax system components 
discussed. 
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Table 4. 14: Income Disclosure 
I disclose all income earned for tax purposes Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 10 9.3 
Disagree 29 26.9 
Not sure 10 9.3 
Agree 43 39.8 
Strongly agree 16 14.8 
Total 108 100 
  Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.3.6 Payment of Tax Assessed 
Payment of actual taxes assessed was another indicator to measure tax compliance among 
medium and small taxpayers in Tanga city. Figure 4.11 indicates that, most of respondents 
are paying the actual taxes assessed as they agreed to the statement. Other groups of 
Strong agreement, disagreement and not sure were minority in terms of number. Generally 
the society is paying the so assessed taxes as a result of positive social norms in taxation 
and good tax system previously discussed. 
 
  Figure 4.11: Payment of Tax Assessed  
  Source: Field data 2013 
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4.3.3.7 Role of Tax Consultants 
Role of tax consultants on tax compliance has been in positive way. Most of respondents 
as shown in Table 4.15 agreed that, their tax consultants’ advice them on how best to pay 
the correct amount of taxes as opposed to tax avoidance, this group was followed by those 
who were not sure and those who strongly disagreed the mentioned statement. 
    
Table 4.15: Role of Tax Consultants 
Tax consultants advice us on how best to pay 
correct amount of tax 
Frequency Percent 
Strongly disagree 12 11.1 
Not sure 30 27.8 
Agree 60 55.6 
Strongly agree 6 5.6 
Total 108 100.0 
Source: Field data 2013 
 
4.3.3.8 Influence of Tax Officials Practices 
 
Figure 4.12: Influence of Tax Officials Practices  
Source: Field data 2013 
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Most of the respondents were not sure if their tax paying behavior were affected by tax 
official’s practices and behavior as displayed in figure 4.12. Strong disagreement group 
were following group and followed by disagreement and agreement groups. 
 
4.4 Correlation Analysis 
Under this study two tailed Pearson’s correlation analysis was used to describe the 
strength and direction of the linear relationship between two variables. Correlation 
coefficients (r) can take values from –1 to +1. The sign out the front indicates whether 
there is a positive correlation or a negative correlation.  The size of the absolute value 
provides an indication of the strength of the relationship. A perfect correlation of 1 or –1 
indicates that the value of one variable can be determined exactly by knowing the value on 
the other variable. On the other hand, a correlation of 0 indicates no relationship between 
the two variables.  
 
In this analysis columns are numbered and each number is defined with respective number 
labeled in the respective row, for example in table 4.16, column number 1 means 
commitment of society to pay taxes, 2 means influence to pay taxes, 3 means person 
required to pay taxes etc. With the tabled matrixes discussion was centered on correlation 
matrixes of items under study, table 4.16 will discuss correlation between components of 
social norms (number 1 to 5) and tax compliance (number 6 to 11). On other hand Table 
4.17 will discuss correlation between components of tax system (number 1 to 5) and tax 
compliance (number 6 to 11) and Table 4.18 will discuss correlation between components 
of social norms (number 1 to 5) and tax system (number 6 to 10). In the matrixes the 
discussed correlation coefficients was shaded and from the discussed correlations, strong 
correlation coefficients was then selected, flagged and discussed in detail in order to 
determine the nature and magnitude of relationship between the components under study.  
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4.4.1 Social Norm and Tax Compliance 
Table 4.16 explains relationships between the constraints of social norms and tax 
compliance discussed respectively, correlation coefficient between components number 1 
to 5 and 6 to 11 are discussed as presented in table 4.16. From the matrix it can be shown 
that the commitment of society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay 
tax, perception to tax evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects 
taxpaying behavior with correlation of (r =  -0.162, -0.143, 0.212, 0.219 and 0.053). Also 
commitment of society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay tax, 
perception to tax evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects an issuance 
of tax invoice/receipt positively with correlations of (r = 0.05, 0.045, 0.470, 0.397 and 
0.078).  
 
Also commitment of society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay 
tax, perception to tax evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects non 
attempt to avoid tax positively with correlations of (r = 0.140, 0.135, 0.310, 0.097 and 
0.07).On other hand commitment of society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person 
required to pay tax, perception to tax evaders, and relationship between TRA and 
taxpayers affects payment of taxes on or before due dates positively with correlations of (r 
= 0.254, 0.223, 0.280, 0.276 and 0.090).These social norms constraints, commitment of 
society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay tax, perception to tax 
evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects disclosure of income for tax 
purpose positively with correlations of (r = 0.040,0.116, 0.171, 0.148 and 0.079). Also 
commitment of society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay tax, 
perception to tax evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects the 
payment of actual tax assessed with correlations of (r = 0.056, 0.065, 0.257, 0.282 and 
0.233 ). 
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By considering the observed strong correlations among social norms constraints and tax 
compliance constraints namely person required to pay taxes and payment of taxes with r = 
0.212, perception to tax evaders and payment of taxes with r = 0.219, person required to 
pay taxes and issuance of tax invoices with r = 0.470, perception to tax evaders and 
issuance of receipt/tax invoice r = 0.397.Others are person required to pay taxes and 
attempt to avoid taxes with r = 0.310, commitment of society to pay tax and payment of 
taxes on due dates with r = 0.254, influence to pay taxes and payment of taxes on due 
dates with r = 0.223, person required to pay taxes and payment of taxes on due dates with 
r = 0.280 and  perception to tax evaders and payment of taxes on due dates with r = 0.276. 
Others are person required to pay taxes and income disclosure for tax purposes with r = 
0.171, perception to tax evaders and income disclosure for tax purpose with r =0.148. 
Lastly person required to pay taxes and payment of actual tax assessed r = 0.257, 
perception to tax evaders payment of actual tax assessed with r =0.282 and TRA 
relationship with taxpayers and payment of actual tax assessed with r = 0.233. These 
correlations signify the existence of positive relationship between social norms and tax 
compliance. 
 
4.4.2 Tax System and Tax Compliance 
Table 4.17 explains relationship between the constraints of tax system and tax compliance 
explained respectively, correlation coefficient between components number 1 to 5 and 6 to 
11 are discussed as presented in table 4.17. From the matrix it can be shown that the tax 
calculations and procedures, number of taxes administered by TRA, tax collection 
methods used by TRA, use of penalties and offences and use of tax audit affects taxpaying 
behavior positively with correlation of (r =  -0.220, 0.412, 0.381, -0.041 and 0.289). Also 
tax calculations and procedures, number of taxes administered by TRA, tax collection 
methods used by TRA, use of penalties and offences and use of tax audit affects issuance 
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of receipt/tax invoice positively with correlations of (r = 0.085, 0.585, 0.204, 0.088 and 
0.227) .Also tax calculations and procedures, number of taxes administered by TRA, tax 
collection methods used by TRA, use of penalties and offences and use of tax audit affects 
non attempt to avoid tax positively with correlations of (r = -0.040, 0.444, 0.585, -0.108 
and 0.132).On other hand tax calculations and procedures, number of taxes administered 
by TRA, tax collection methods used by TRA, use of penalties and offences and use of tax 
audit affects payment of taxes on or before due dates positively with correlations of (r 
0.107, 0.259, 0.402, -0.027 and 0.074). 
 
These tax system constraints namely tax calculations and procedures, number of taxes 
administered by TRA, tax collection methods used by TRA, use of penalties and offences 
and use of tax audit affects disclosure of income for tax purpose with correlations of (r 
=0.161, 0.312, 0.294, -0.150 and 0.108). Also tax calculations and procedures, number of 
taxes administered by TRA, tax collection methods used by TRA, use of penalties and 
offences and use of tax audit affects the payment of actual tax assessed with correlations 
of (r = 0.117, 0.309, 0.668, -0.116, 0.263). 
 
By considering the observed strong correlations among tax system constraints and tax 
compliance constraints namely number of taxes administered by TRA and payment of 
taxes with r =0.412, tax collection method used by TRA and payment of taxes with r 
=0.381 and TRA use of tax audit and payment of taxes with r =0.289. Others are number 
of taxes administered by TRA and issuance of receipt/tax invoice with r =0.585, tax 
collection method used by TRA and issuance of receipt/tax invoice with r =0.204 and 
TRA use of tax audit and issuance of receipt/tax invoice with r =0.227, number of taxes 
administered by TRA and non attempt to avoid taxes with r =0.444, tax collection method 
used by TRA and non attempt to avoid taxes with r =0.585.Also number of taxes 
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administered by TRA and payment of taxes in due dates with r =0.259, tax collection 
method used by TRA and payment of taxes on due dates with r =0.402. Number of taxes 
administered by TRA and income disclosure for tax purposes with r =0.312, tax collection 
method used by TRA and income disclosure for tax purposes with r =0.294. Lastly 
number of taxes administered by TRA and payment of actual tax assessed with r =0.309, 
tax collection method used by TRA and payment of actual tax assessed with r =0.668 and 
TRA use of tax audit and payment of actual tax assessed with r =0.263. These explained 
correlations signify the existence of positive relationship between tax system and tax 
compliance. 
 
4.4.3 Social Norms and Tax System 
Table 4.18 explains relationship between the constraints of social norms and tax system 
discussed respectively, correlation coefficient between components number 1 to 5 and 6 to 
10 are discussed as presented in table 4.18. From the matrix it can be shown that the 
commitment of society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay tax, 
perception to tax evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects tax 
calculation and procedures with correlation of (r = -0.14, 0.157, -0.1, 0.034 and -0.032). 
Also commitment of society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay 
tax, perception to tax evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects 
number of taxes administered by TRA positively with correlations of (r = -0.103, -0.082, 
0.507, 0.440 and 0.187).On other hand commitment of society to pay tax, the influence to 
pay tax, person required to pay tax, perception to tax evaders, and relationship between 
TRA and taxpayers affects tax collection method used by TRA with correlations of (r = 
0.156, 0.063, 0.081, 0.092 and 0.273).These social norms constraints, commitment of 
society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay tax, perception to tax 
evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects use of penalties and offences 
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with correlations of (r = -0.13, -0.01, 0.082, 0.236 and -0.156). Also commitment of 
society to pay tax, the influence to pay tax, person required to pay tax, perception to tax 
evaders, and relationship between TRA and taxpayers affects the use of tax audit with 
correlations of (r = -0.064, -0.156, 0.089, 0.238 and 0.041). 
 
By considering the observed strong correlations among social norms constraints and tax 
system constraints namely influence to pay tax and tax calculations and procedures with r 
= 0.157, person required to pay taxes and number of taxes administered by TRA with r 
=0.507,perception to tax evaders and number of taxes with r =0.444.Others are TRA 
relationship with taxpayers and tax collection method used by TRA with r =0.273, 
perception to tax evaders and TRA use of Penalty with r =0.263.Lastly is perception to tax 
evaders and TRA use of tax audit with r =0.238.  These explained correlations signify the 
existence of relationship between social norms and tax system. 
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Table 4.16: Correlation Matrix between Social Norms and Tax Compliance 
Constraints 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Our society is committed to pay taxes 
(1) 
1           
Our taxpaying behavior is influenced 
by some members of your society (2) 
.222
*
 1          
In our society every person who earns 
income is required to pay tax (3) 
.025 
-
.213
*
 
1         
Tax evaders are not seen as heroes in 
our society (4) 
-.096 
-
.093 
.554
**
 1        
Our relationship with TRA is a long 
term venture (5) 
-.134 
-
.184 
.307
**
 .101 1       
I have been paying taxes since the 
commencement of my business (6) 
-.162 
-
.143 
.212
*
 .219
*
 .053 1      
We always issue receipts/tax invoice 
for every business transaction we make 
(7) 
.050 .045 .470
**
 .397
**
 .078 .273
**
 1     
I never attempted to avoid taxes (8) .140 .135 .310
**
 .097 .070 .398
**
 .660
**
 1    
I always pay my taxes on or before due 
dates (9) 
.254
**
 .223
*
 .280
**
 .276
**
 .090 .036 .651
**
 .700
**
 1   
I disclose all income earned for tax 
purposes (10) 
.040 .116 .171 .148 .079 .233
*
 .434
**
 .561
**
 .460
**
 1  
I always pay the actual assessed tax 
(11) 
.056 .065 .257
**
 .282
**
 .233
*
 .308
**
 .521
**
 .730
**
 .718
**
 .537
**
 1 
Source: Field data 2013 
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Table 4.17: Correlation Matrix between Tax System and Tax Compliance 
Constraints 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
I perform my own tax 
calculations and procedures 
(1) 
1           
Taxes administered by TRA 
are reasonable in number for 
the authority to manage (2) 
-.139 1          
Tax collection methods used 
by TRA are friendly (3) 
.093 .100 1         
TRA use of penalties and 
offences will combat tax 
evasion (4) 
-.085 .013 .025 1        
TRA use of tax audit will 
combat tax evasion (5) 
-.067 .058 .316
**
 .647
**
 1       
I have been paying taxes 
since the commencement of 
my business (6) 
-.220
*
 .412
**
 .381
**
 -.041 .289
**
 1      
We always issue receipts/tax 
invoice for every business 
transaction we make (7) 
.085 .585
**
 .204
*
 .088 .227
*
 .273
**
 1     
I never attempted to avoid 
taxes (8) 
-.040 .444
**
 .585
**
 -.108 .132 .398
**
 .660
**
 1    
I always pay my taxes on or 
before due dates (9) 
.107 .259
**
 .402
**
 -.027 .074 .036 .651
**
 .700
**
 1   
I disclose all income earned 
for tax purposes (10) 
.161 .312
**
 .294
**
 -.150 .108 .233
*
 .434
**
 .561
**
 .460
**
 1  
I always pay the actual 
assessed tax (11) 
.117 .309
**
 .668
**
 -.116 .263
**
 .308
**
 .521
**
 .730
**
 .718
**
 .537
**
 1 
Source: Field data 2013 
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Table 4.18: Correlation Matrix between Social Norms and Tax System Constraints 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Our society is committed to pay taxes (1) 1          
Our taxpaying behavior is influenced by some 
members of your society (2) 
.222
*
 1         
In our society every person who earns income 
is required to pay tax (3) 
.025 
-
.213
*
 
1        
Tax evaders are not seen as heroes in our 
society (4) 
-
.096 
-
.093 
.554
**
 1       
Our relationship with TRA is a long term 
venture (5) 
-
.134 
-
.184 
.307
**
 .101 1      
I perform my own tax calculations and 
procedures (6) 
-
.014 
.157 -.100 .034 -.032 1     
Taxes administered by TRA are reasonable in 
number for the authority to manage (7) 
-
.103 
-
.082 
.507
**
 .440
**
 .187 
-
.139 
1    
Tax collection methods used by TRA are 
friendly (8) 
.156 .063 .081 .092 .273
**
 .093 .100 1   
TRA use of penalties and offences will combat 
tax evasion (9) 
-
.013 
-
.010 
.082 .236
*
 -.156 
-
.085 
.013 .025 1  
TRA use of tax audit will combat tax evasion 
(10) 
-
.064 
-
.156 
-.089 .238
*
 .041 
-
.067 
.058 .316
**
 .647
**
 1 
Source: Field data 2013 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This Chapter is divided into three parts. The first part presents summary of the study, the 
second part is about general conclusion and the third part provides recommendations. 
 
5.1       Summary 
This study was carried out with the view of determining interrelationship between social 
norms, tax system and tax compliance among small and medium taxpayers operating in 
Tanga city. Specifically this study had three main objectives first was to determine the 
relationship between social norms and tax compliance, second was to determine the 
relationship between tax systems and tax compliance and third was to determine the 
relationship between tax systems and social norms. 
 
Literature review discussed the main concepts which have been offered to account for tax 
compliance and its relationship with social norms and tax system. Literature review for the 
rationale of developing the conceptual framework of this study dwells on theoretical and 
empirical evidence from the discussions on the tax compliance and its relation with tax 
system and social norms. The Chapter winded up by presenting a theoretical framework 
and a conceptual model derived from reviewed literature. The theoretical framework was 
aimed at analyzing the interrelationship between the three variables. The selected area for 
the research was Tanga city which is among the seven districts in the regions located in 
the northern coast of Tanzania. The city is having 7,124 live taxpayers divided in three 
blocks, namely Mkwakwani with 1,547 taxpayers, Ngamiani with 3,065 taxpayers and 
Chuda with 2,512 taxpayers (RM TRA Tanga, 2012) and the sample size taken was 108 
respondents. This study used both primary data which was originally collected from the 
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field and secondary data of which its nature is merely that of compilation of others work 
on the subject.  
 
Quantitative data collected was analyzed using SPSS of which the researcher was able to 
draw patterns of relationships on the subject. Descriptive analysis by frequency was used 
to study the characteristics of the sampled population including age, sex, type of 
respondent etc, also charts and tables was used to study relationship among study 
variables. Under this study also two tailed pearson’s Correlation analysis displayed in 
correlation matrix was used to describe the strength and direction of the linear relationship 
between the selected variables and the significant coefficients were flagged.  
 
With respect to the first objective of determining relationship between social norms and 
tax compliance, both charts and correlation matrix were used. Charts and tables alignment 
showed existence of positive relationship between social norms and tax compliance 
constraints. Using correlation matrix, significant correlations ranging from r= 0.2 to r= 0.5 
among most of the social norms and tax compliance components were enough to display 
the nature and magnitude of this relationship between social norms and tax compliance. 
Considering the second objective of determining relationship between tax system and tax 
compliance also charts and correlation matrix were used. Charts and tables alignment 
showed existence of positive relationship between tax system and tax compliance 
constraints. Using correlation matrix, significant correlations ranging from r= 0.2 to r= 0.7 
among most of the social norms and tax compliance components were enough to display 
the nature and magnitude of this relationship between constraints under second objective. 
With last objective of determining relationship between social norms and tax system both 
chats alignment and significant correlation coefficient ranging from r= 0.2 to r= 0.5 
explained the relationship between social norms and tax system. 
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5.2 Implication of the Results 
The findings have interesting implications for compliance management strategies that 
deliberately or incidentally affect social norms and tax system. The results suggest that 
regulatory strategies to increase tax compliance could refer to ethical beliefs, for instance 
through persuasive appeals that attempt to increase taxpaying ethics. However, it would be 
difficult to change each taxpayer’s ethics individually. Because personal beliefs are based 
on social norms of groups with whom taxpayers identify, it would therefore be a better 
strategy to refer to broader social norms of a certain group to ensure that taxpayers 
identify with that group sufficiently. Also a tax system which is compatible with the 
identified social norms should be in place for improvement of tax compliance. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The study made on the influence of social norms and tax system on tax compliance using 
descriptive analysis and correlation analysis come out to show three major significant 
relationships. As a society become more committed to pay taxes, positively influence 
others to pay tax, have good relationship with tax authority and feel the benefit of paying 
taxes the level of tax compliance increases. This was supported with the discussed charts 
and graphs alignment of social norms and tax compliance components, also this was 
supported by significant correlation coefficients (ranging 0.2 to 0.5) between social norms 
and tax compliance components. Therefore there is positive relationship between social 
norms and tax compliance. The study also showed existence of significant positive 
relationship between tax system and tax compliance. This was elaborated by graphs, tables 
and correlation matrix (r ranging from 0.2 to 0.7) which showed that, as tax system and 
tax collection method become simpler the level of tax compliance increases and opposite 
is the same. Lastly the study determined existence of positive relationship between social 
norms and tax system. Society’s perception to tax has great influence on how the tax 
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system should be and this makes different societies (countries) to have different tax 
system. 
 
5.4 Recommendation  
The following recommendations are made for improvement of the existing tax compliance 
level as related to social norms and tax system. First is practical implementation of 
penalties and offences provided under tax laws and associated regulations in order to build 
tax payment culture. Second is more simplification of tax laws or provision of tax laws 
interpretation manuals to taxpayers in order to encourage voluntary tax compliance to 
most of Tanzanians who cannot easily interpret tax laws. Lastly in order to enhance the 
existing tax compliance among small and medium taxpayers tax authority should improve 
harmonious working relationship with all stakeholders, this will also build strong positive 
public image of the revenue authority in Tanzania. 
 
5.5 Limitations of the Study 
This research has also some limitations including the following, while it was assumed that 
social norms would only be effective through their internalization as personal norms, 
personal norms are not necessarily the same as the internalized norms of a particular 
group. Personal norms may be fed by norms of many different social groups with which 
one identifies, except if a certain group context is so salient in a given situation that it 
totally dominates one’s current self-concept (Simon, 1997). Personal norms may 
furthermore be based on one’s individual identity, on intergroup comparisons and 
differentiation from other members of one’s group, again except if the group is so salient 
that it is incompatible with intergroup differentiation (Turner, 1987a). If the in group had 
been made salient and a person identity been activated when personal and social norms 
were measured, a stronger mediation effect should have resulted. While acknowledging 
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the said limitation, the present findings suggest that social norms and tax system can 
influence tax compliance. 
 
5.6 Areas for Further Research on Tax Compliance 
Using Single location (Tanga city) may be difficult to generalize the influence of social 
norms and tax system on tax compliance for other locations, for future researches, a 
reanalysis should also be done comparing variances among different locations. The 
analysis would examine the different social norms, tax system, and demographic 
characteristics that may lead to tax compliance or non compliance among taxpayers from 
different locations under different categories. 
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APPNDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Questionnaire  
Open University of Tanzania 
Faculty of Business Management 
Questionnaire for Masters of Business Administration 
This questionnaire is to be filled in by owners or managers of Small and medium 
taxpayers operating in Tanga city. 
 
Dear respondent, 
I kindly request you to participate in this study of determining the influence of social 
norms and tax system on tax compliance. I would be grateful if you would volunteer your 
precious time to assist in this study by filling the questionnaire which is intending to 
capture your views and perceptions on the subject. The information given will be treated 
as a confidential and used for only academic purposes. 
 
Part1: Demographic Information. 
 (a) 
Category of 
respondent 
Age of 
respondent 
Gender Marital Status 
a. Owner 
b. Manager 
c. Director 
d. Accountant 
a. Under 
18 
b. 18-35 
c. 35-60 
d. Above 
60 
a. Female 
b. Male 
a. Married 
b. Single 
c. Divorced 
d. Widowed 
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b) 
Educational level Age of business Nature of business Type of taxpayer 
(a) Primary 
(b) Secondary 
(c) Certificate 
(d) Diploma and 
above 
(a) 0-4 
(b) 5-9 
(c) 10-14 
(d) 15 and 
above 
(a) Retail 
(b) Whole sale 
(c) 
Manufacturer 
       (d) service   
(a) Presumptive 
(b) Accounts case 
 
Part 2: Study questions 
Please respond to the following statements by indicating the extent to which you agree or 
disagree, using the listed scale (please use tick for your choice). 
Strongly 
Agree(SA) 
Agree (A) Not Sure (NS) Disagree (DA) Strongly 
Disagree (SD) 
5 4 3 2 1 
 
(a) Social norms SA 
5 
A 
4 
NS 
3 
DA 
2 
SD 
1 
1 Our society is committed to pay 
taxes. 
     
2 Our taxpaying behavior is influenced 
by some members of society. 
     
3 We benefit from taxes we pay to 
TRA 
     
4 In our society every person who earns 
income is required to pay tax. 
     
5 Tax evaders are not seen as heroes in 
our society. 
     
6 Our relationship with TRA is a long 
term venture 
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 (b) Tax system SA 
5 
A 
4 
NS 
3 
DA 
2 
SD 
1 
1 I perform my own tax calculations and 
procedures. 
 
     
2 My tax consultant performs my tax 
calculations and procedures. 
 
     
3 Taxes administered by TRA are 
reasonable in number for the authority to 
manage. 
     
4 Tax collection methods used by TRA are 
friendly. 
     
5 TRA use of penalties and offences will 
combat tax evasion. 
     
6 TRA use of tax audit will combat tax 
evasion. 
     
 
 (c ) Tax Compliance SA 
5 
A 
4 
NS 
3 
DA 
2 
SD 
1 
1 I Have been paying taxes since the 
commencement of my business. 
     
2 We always issue receipt/tax invoice for 
every business transaction we make. 
     
3  I never attempted to avoid taxes.      
63 
 
4 I always pay my taxes on or before due 
dates. 
     
5 I disclose all income earned for tax 
purposes. 
     
6 I always pay the actual assessed tax.      
7 I Have once been audited by TRA.      
8 Every time I got audited by TRA there was 
no additional taxes realized. 
     
9 Tax consultants advice us on how best to 
pay correct amount of tax on time and not 
on how to evade tax. 
     
10 Tax officials’ practices and behavior affects 
our taxpaying behavior. 
     
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research 
 
 
